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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
fLOYD E. HARMSTON, 
Plaintiff/appellant, 
Supreme Court No. 19297 
vs. 
T. R. HARMSTON, 
Defendant/respondent. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff Floyd E. Harmston 
to set aside deeds granting a remainding interest in certain oil 
eights to his brother, T. R. Harmston. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court on January 17, 1983. 
From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and cancellation 
of the deeds in question as a matter of law, or in the alternative, 
;i new trial. 
STi\TE:·1E:JT OF F/\:'TS 
Floyd Hannston (plaintiff-apoellant herein) •.,·cis 
originall; from Roosevelt, but spent mnst of his life in Provo, 
Utah. Following his wife's death in 1979, he left Provo 
and returned to Roosevelt to live. Plaintiff's brother, r. 
Harmston (respondent herein), also lived in Roosevelt (R . .J)i. 
the Swruner and into the Fall of 1980, the plaintiff '.vas in t!'e 
regular company of his brother, the respondent. ( R. 138, :r. ; 
During August and September of 1980, plaintiff developed an obse', 
belief that his adopted son was stealing from him (R. 138, tr. 
Respondent played a role in this mistaken belief (R. 126 I 
certain extent encouraged the misunderstanding (R. 138, tr. 
During August and September, 1980, plaintiff was also 0Jer; conLo': 
about his assets (R. 138). 
On October 2, 1980, the plaintiff executed the ·,;ill ac,; 
deeds at issue. Attorney Dennis L. Draney helped plaintiff 
prepare a new will as well as the conveying instruments (R. 11]' 
Attorney Draney recalled that the plaintiff was confused ourrna , .. , 
period of time he wished to make the conveyance to respondent, e: 
for this reason Draney required plaintiff to return several 
times before he allowed the execution of the will and deeds to .o 
place (R. 138, tr. 169, 181-182 I. The olaintiff intended both 2°'· 
and after October 2, 1980, that his estate and inheritance na'.:'o'.'-
pass to his adopted son Howard Blumer and then to his gr3r,,lch:'.cc 
(R. 5) . Only for a short two month period did :)laintiff mio'=a:•.o'. 
believe his adopted son stealing from and that 
his adopted son Bhould receive no 1nher1t3nce. 
deeds 1n questinn had the effect of 
-1-
edopted son and grandchildren, of a substantial portion of 
.; .•state. When shortly thereafter plaintiff asked respondent to 
""'urn the deeds, respondent refused. Plaintiff then directed Attorney 
Hall to prepare an affidavit for him. Eleven days later, on 
•ct0ber 13, plaintiff executed the affidavit, recanting the October 
1980 deed (R. 5). 
In March, 1981, this action was brought by the plaintiff 
tu set aside the inadvertant conveyance to respondent. In /lay, 
1982, First Security Bank was appointed conservator for plaintiff's 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT'S MISREPRESENTATION THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
ADOPTED SON WAS TAKING PLAINTIFF'S ASSETS CREATED 
A MATERIAL MISTAKE OF FACT IN THE MIND OF 
PLAINTIFF AND REQUIRES THAT THE DEEDS CONVEYED 
TO RESPONDENT BE CANCELLED. 
The reason given by the respondent for plaintiff's recon-
"eyance of deeds originally held for his adopted son, Howard Blumer, is 
plaintiff's apparent belief during August and Seoternber of 1980, that 
"1r. Blumer was stealing monthly payments being paid into trust by the 
8Urchaser of the petitioner's former residence. Yet respondent actively 
encouraged plaintiff in this mistaken belief by making such comments as 
"Howard has jumped the gun. Hell, it all belonged to him anyway" and 
"I don't know why he'd want to do that" (R. 138, Respondent's testimony 
3tl7-18). 
Plaintiff's deposition, republished as part of the record in 
lieu of plaintiff's testimony at trial (R. 126), indicates the 
did persuade the plaintiff to mistakenly believe that 
Howard Blumer was stealing from the petitioner: 
Q. What if anything did he (the respondent) tell you 
about reasons for signing the mineral interests to him? 
-3-
A. \\ell, as I told '/OU, '.1e c011•.='d ar.2 
me that Howard was going to steal evPr;thing that r 
So I got to thinking about it, ,rnd I +:hnught, 'AT•ell, 'ci· 
what he's (Howard's) thinking. 
(R. 126, Plaintiff's deposition at 8). 
In spite of this evidence of respondents overreachico 
and misrepresentations to the plaintiff, the trial court fa1lQ' 
find that the respondent in any way attempted to persuarle o!ai··.· 
that his adopted son was not acting in plaintiff's best interes· 
No Utah Courts have addressed the issue whether a .- 8 r,"e.: 
based on a unilateral mistake of fact may be set aside. T'.te ge:.E:· 
rule, however, is clear: courts have authority to cancel a con'.'e"· 
if it is occassioned by a unilateral and material mistake cf c•:: 
in the granter. As stated in 23 Am Jur 2d Deeds, § 157: 
of equity will cancel a deed for material mistake of ciace :, 
granter"; and in 23 Am Jur 2d Deeds, § 155: "Mistake of fact: ic:, 
however, a well recognized ground for interposition of a 
equity." 
Courts of Oklahoma and Colorado have set aside ccn•:e"3C:' 
when the Granter was acting upon a unilateral and material 
fact. In \'lomble v. Mahoney, 383 P.2d 26, 29 (Okla. :96Ji, a 
conveyance was cancelled because it was based upon a unilatera: 
mistake of fact going to the essence. The Oklahoma court -.,en' :· 
state that a case for recission and cancellation was made stron,e: 
where the unilateral mistake of fact was 3 result of 
(even an innocent misrepresentation) by the nther party. 
Colorado rule was reaffirmed i'1 Tilbuc: 1)si'1unCson, 352 ? 
(Colo. 1964) as follows: 
Equitable relief will be :n -1ses nf 
when the fact concern1no tne 
made is material to 
- .j-
substance and not merely its incidence, and the 
mistake itself is so important that it determines the 
conduct of the mistaken parties. 
Like \·lomble, even if respondent's comments to the 
111ntiff regarding plaintiff's stepson were innocently made, the 
,»n'ie·;ance to respondent should be cancelled because the ensuing 
of fact upon which plaintiff acted went to the essence of 
tee transaction. Like Tilbury, plaintiff was so misled that his 
mistaken belief determined his conduct. Plaintiff actually was convinced 
his stepson was stealing from him. This belief was the sole reason for 
tne plaintiff's actions to change the disposition of his property upon 
lus death. This belief was either initiated by respondent or at least 
encouraged by respondent. 
In Dreyer v. Dreyer, 617 P.2d 955 (Oregon 1980), 
the court said fraud, duress, undue influence and misrepresentation 
are concepts used to void conveyances, especially where lack of 
given by the grantee supports a finding that the trans-
action is unconscionable. In the instant matter, plaintiff made the 
conveyance only because he was mistaken in believing his stepson was 
stealing from him. This alone is grounds for recission, but is 
strengthened by the fact that respondent encouraged this belief 
his actions and therefore perpetuated the misconception and 
tuok the deeds without giving consideration. 
For these reasons, plaintiff was seriously mistaken and 
as to a material fact, at the time of the conveyance to 
respondent. His mistake went to the very essence of the transaction 
,nd determined plaintiff's conduct on October 2, 1980, and has 
in a partial disinheritance of plaintiff's adopted son and 
lJren. 
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II. RESPONDENT'S CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP \'iITH 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S SPIRIT 
AT THE TIME THE DEEDS \VERE EXECUTED SUPPORT A 
PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE nJFLUEnCE. 
When the deeds in question were executed on October 2. 
1980, plaintiff and respondent had recently been spending an 
unprecedented amount of time together. Prior to the summer of 
1980, respondent testified he had visited the plaintiff in Prove 
5 or 6 times in 30 years (R. 138, tr. 24). The apparent 
between the parties prior to August, 1980 finds support in the 
plaintiff's sworn testimony as follows: 
Q. What was the relationship with your brother, let's 
say for a one-year period before the signing of these 
mineral deeds? How did you get along with him? 
A. Well, I got along with him all right. Because we 
never saw one another. I didn't give a damn for him. 
(R. 126 Plaintiff's Deposition at 6-7) 
By September of 1980, however, the respondent was even accompan,·i:: 
plaintiff on errands which were within walking distance of plaint:': 
Roosevelt residence. For example, on at least one occassion the 
visited a bank within walking distance from plaintiff's residence, 
to have respondent's name entered in rlace of plaintiff's stepsc.' 0 
name on plaintiff's bank account (R. 138, Respondent's testimon:· ,. 
46-47). 
While these events were taking place, plaintiff continued :-
in a delicate state of mental health as a result of aging. Dur1M 
August and September of 1980, respondent established a relation°:--
with plaintiff which enabled respondent to exercise superior1t 
influence over plaintiff by accomranyina plaintiff 
respondent was able to rn1srepresentat1ons to plaint1tf 1' 
confidence and to encouraging misunderstandings. 
-6-
'me"· 
The general rule as to when the law raises a preswnption of 
url'iue influence is as follows: 
\'/here a confidential relation is shown to exist 
between the parties to a deed and where the 
grantee . is the dominant spirit in the 
transaction, the law raises a preswntion of undue 
influence. 
21 Am Jur 2d Deeds, § 149. 
The Utah Supreme Court has applied a similar rule. 
In Seequist v. Seequist, 524 P.2d 598 (Utah 1974), the Utah court 
found that a confidential relationship existed between a mother 
and son, and went on to rule that a conveyance of property for a 
sum not approximating fair market value was a breach of the relation-
ship and required that the conveyance be set aside. And in Blankenship v. 
Christensen, 622 P.2d 806 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court found 
that a husband and wife relationship and a grantor's mental incapacity 
supported a finding that the conveyance was procurred by undue 
influence. The Blankenship court also found that a grantor with a 
t:'.: delicate mental condition was more susceptable to undue inf 1 uence 
from a person in whom he placed confidence. In other words, once 
2 , a confidential relation is established, the likelihood of finding 
n'! that the grantee is a dominant spirit is increased, especially where, 
,. as in the instant case, the grantor has a delicate mental condition. 
Plaintiff obviously reposed great confidence in the 
c ·- respondent just prior to the conveyance on October 2, 1980. The 
na :acts indicate plaintiff was constantly asking respondent to take 
him on errands and even on long trips (R. 138, Respondent's testimony 
2·.' at 41-42). Plaintiff even displayed his personal assets before the 
(R. 138, Respondent's testimony at 13-14). Based on 
;;ec:quist and Blankenship, a confidential relationship existed between 
;la1ntiff and respondent. Respondent was able to easily influence 
-7-
and persuade the plaintiff, who was the respondent's older brothet 
by nearly 13 years. Indeed, a sibling relationship alone has uPe· 
enough for some courts to find that a confidential relationship 
existed between the parties. 
270 (Okla. 1960). 
See Roberts v. HUPlphreys, 356 P .. · 
The trial court, however, refused to find either that a 
confidential relationship existed between the parties or that the 
respondent was the dominant spirit. The court ignored plaintiff' 5 
testimony, evidence of his delicate mental condition, and the fact 
that his property was conveyed to the respondent for no consident_·· 
The lower court incorrectly required the plaintiff, rather than tc.e 
respondent, to bear the burden of proof. The burden should have '"' 
placed on respondent, by virtue of his confidential relation to 
plaintiff and the complete lack of consideration given for the deec 
Had the burden been placed on the respondent, the circumstantial 
evidence introduced by plaintiff in the lower court would not have 
needed to show respondent's overreaching by clear and convincing 
evidence; rather, plaintiff only would have been required to raise 
an inference of overreaching and undue influence on the respondent's 
part. Against this standard, plaintiff's evidence raises a preswnp: .. 
in the respondent. Respondent should be made to rebut this presJr.c· 
Other courts have reversed decisions grounded upon impr::' 
placing the burden of proof upon the grantor. In Mc!'Jabb v. Brewstc• 
272 P. 2d 298 (Idaho 1954), the Idaho Supreme Court followed 
Sparks v. Mendoza, 83 Cal App. 2d 511, 189 P.2d 43, 45 (19481 ac: 
reversed the lower court's upholding of a conveyance because 
the burden of proof was not properly placed upon the grantee 
-8-
2C 
1 nce a confidential relation and lack of consideration were proven by 
t.he grantor: 
If a confidential relationship exists between a 
grantor and grantee and there is no consideration, 
a presumption of fraud and undue influence arises 
shifting the burden of proof to the grantee to 
show fairness and good faith in the transaction, 
and upon his failure to (rebut,) the presumption of 
fraud and undue influence prevails and will support 
a finding that there was not a delivery of a deed. 
272 P. 2d at 301. 
Plaintiff herein has alleged facts and circumstances 
sufficient to allow the court to find that a confidential relationship 
existed. And, of course, respondent gave no consideration for the 
conveyance. In Roberts v. Humphreys, supra, the court said where 
a confidential relation and lack of consideration were found, the 
burden shifted onto "the one occupying . the position of confidence" 
requiring him "to go forward and make a full and complete disclosure 
showing absolute good faith and that there was no fraud or undue 
influence practiced in the transaction . 356 P.2d at 374. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in Gosa v. Willas, 341 So.2d 
t'o 699 (Ala. 1977), recently affirmed the setting aside of a deed for 
undue influence upon finding a confidential relation and a dominant 
spirit. The Alabama court also noted that no consideration had been 
given, and that: 
Id. at 
For the presumption to be raised, it is not 
necessary that the confidential relation be 
a fiduciary relation; it is sufficient that 
confidence is reposed and accepted in any 
of the relations in which dominion may be 
exercised by one person over another. 
701. 
The only time the grantor has the burden of proving, by 
:!ear and convincing evidence, that the grantee practiced undue 
-9-
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._·J.se ... '··Jrt Si=>t 3s1J.e 3. largel:· 
· 1\JS•· '-'t 1 rant<Jr' s del.ic:..=itc :ner.tal cond1t1on ar:d ::::or.f1dent:.1al 
i _·.nsh1µ w·1th the grantee. 
JS1de of conve:·ances, even though the arantee's exercise 0f 
111: j(_' l'lfluence is 11m1ted to 3.n ":1onest, o'.·er-zea.:.0usness enqe::.c!ered 
'd :-noc1'.'es," •,.,:here a con':ey3nce is obta1neri :.;i S;Jlte cf a 
,\ preswnpt1on of bad fait!: is .1;, eC!·...:1table b...ir:::!e:i 
:__,•-' borne b'.:' the :;ran tee in such a case, because a ·'.]rarltOr ln .J. 
· lt':- state of rri1nd is eas1 pursuaded b·/ a ::·er son · ... 
lS reposed. For thl:'se reasons, 
and the fairness of the transaction itself should be ::::on-
if the 1s rights are to be protected. 
In Gme1ner ·:. Y'1cte, S92 P.2d Si 1Id'1ho 19791, :::Jaho 
C1-Jurt perhaps the elernen+:.s 3.ppl1ed .i:-i -:ases _._, 
Gme1ner, that 3 
Jside as being induced by influence +:.here :s evidence 
a. some J1m1nut1on and mental capacity; 
b. some of conf 1dence placed :n the grantee; and 
"_.1L' lnst.J.nt t- ·r, ":..'i.e.;·: are all 
,.., .J.::) :--> .:_ ; 'I :' .:._ ·.2 .Jr, t n :- ;_ i:,__,e ·:r:lr":: 0: :=il3int1ff at <:he 
was stealing from him. 
made, respondent was in regular pl31nt1ff, 
plaintiff on visits to attorne:/s offi<cc t0 'r"pore 3nd Sl'Jn •cc 
and assisted and encouraged plaintiff to chJnqP banks and , 
on accounts. During this period in which plaintiff '"'as rel";-
on respondent's recommendations, respondent recei·:ed 
remainder interests in the oil producing properties and adrn1•ej_ 
gave no consideration in exchange. Before plaintiffs moved 
to Roosevelt in 1980, he and respondent had ver1 little conta:• 
plaintiff's adopted son and grandchildren were the intended 
beneficiaries and natural objects of his bountf. 
the execution of the deeds to respondent, plaintiff executed ac 
affidavit reaffirming his prior will giving his propertJ •c i1s 
adopted son and disallowing the deeds to respondent. 
The above facts clearly establish that bad faith and 
influence were practiced in the transaction between respondent o· 
his older brother, and require that the conveyance of the 
question be set aside. 
CONCLCSION 
The court should find that cilaint1ff ·,,,as 
mistake of materi3l fact :...n >-?xecut1ng the to res;inr.der.:., 
that the conveyance should be rescinded. Th,e ,:ourt s:'10•1:d a:s: '-
that the burden ::if proc,f in this c-ase rests J()r:r. ::'='s::,:::->-
to rebut the presumoticn o: undue 
confidential relat1onsn1p the .... 
given for the deed, :-Jhen +-_'.le :i.r·· -;-:af"T1:_'1· ri :..n .... 
respondent's failure 1n 
oence of any undue influence or overreaching and failure to show 
1tsnlote good faith require the deeds to be cancelled. 
DATED THIS _!!f--oay of August, 1983. 
BLACK & MOORE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
BRIEF was sent this J.f21il__aay of August, 1983, to the following: 
:Ir. Herbert •..i. Gillespie 
for respondent 
p:, Box 1948 
oocsevelt, Utah 84066 
:.1ar' B. Cohen 
f,rst Security Bank of Utah N.A. 
Trust Administrator 
of Floyd E. Harmston 
South Street 
0 .0. Box 3007 
sa:t Lake City, Utah 84111 
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